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8Executive summary
Colombia is considered one of the most 
advanced countries in Latin America for 
disaster risk reduction (DRR). Decades of state 
engagement in large-scale disasters has generated 
a relatively mature legal and institutional 
framework governing disaster response and risk 
reduction, developed over the past 20–30 years. 
However, the country also has a long history of 
conflict, involving targeted killings, generalised 
violence, kidnapping and extortion. Despite a 
recent peace process, violence continues.
As in many other parts of the world, 
Colombia’s current DRR policy and practice 
fail to take adequate account of the conflict 
situation. As a result, large numbers of conflict-
displaced people (an estimated 15% of the 
country’s population is internally displaced)  
are highly vulnerable, with scant protection 
against the devastating effects of disasters. 
Colombia’s conflict-affected poor are forced  
to live in locations that increase their exposure 
to natural hazards. 
This case study sheds light on why disaster 
risk is so high in Colombia, and how disasters 
and conflict interact to increase vulnerability. 
In addition to exploring the current national 
institutional and policy frameworks for DRR, it 
includes a critical analysis of two recent disasters: 
a landslide in the Mocoa area in 2017 and the 
structural failure of a dam resulting in severe 
flooding of the Cauca River in 2018. 
The findings highlight the complex and 
inherently political nature of DRR efforts in 
a context of conflict, protracted displacement 
and troubled state–society relations. The study 
highlights the need for an approach that goes 
beyond technocratic solutions; the reality that 
there are competing visions for DRR in conflict 
situations; and the fundamental necessity of 
rebuilding the social contract and recognising the 
rights and voices of affected citizens. 
The double impacts of disasters  
and conflict 
Colombia is one of the most hazard-prone 
countries in Latin America, exposed to cyclones, 
coastal and river flooding, earthquakes, 
landslides and volcanic activity. Millions of 
people are displaced due to violence and conflict, 
and levels of poverty and income inequality are 
high. Families often have no other option than to 
live in high-risk areas. The situation is referred to 
locally as ‘doble afectación’ or ‘doubly affected’. 
Since 2012, victims of violence can apply to a 
dedicated government body – Unidad para la 
Atencíon y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas 
(UARIV), known as the ‘Victims’ Unit’ – for 
financial compensation and other benefits, but 
progress in delivering support has been slow. 
Against this background, the government 
has made significant strides over the years 
in implementing more effective disaster risk 
management frameworks, including dedicating a 
national institution, the Unidad Nacional para la 
Gestion del Riesgo en Desastres (National Disaster 
Risk Management Unit) (UNGRD), to that 
purpose. Even so, for a range of reasons, major 
disaster events still exceed the national capacity 
to respond. One of the main factors hampering 
effective DRR is that current approaches to 
disaster and conflict risk are disconnected, with 
UARIV and UNGRD operating independently of 
each other. One consequence is institutional neglect 
of conflict as the context in which DRR ambitions 
are pursued. Lack of funding, corruption and 
insufficient decentralisation of resources also 
hamper effective DRR. Solutions generally lack 
community engagement, tend to rely on external 
technical experts and offer infrastructure solutions, 
rather than building local capacity. All of these 
factors combine to perpetuate a predominantly 
‘top-down’ approach to risk reduction.
9Opposing visions and an ‘uncaring’ 
state 
The 2018 Cauca floods were the result of 
structural failures during the construction of a 
hydropower dam, widely touted as Colombia’s 
largest infrastructure project. The event highlights 
many of the complexities associated with a 
technological or man-made disaster, and its 
politicisation. First, because it was not caused by 
a natural hazard, and there were vested political 
and private interests, the government refused 
to classify it as a disaster. Second, the state 
was unwilling or unable to categorise affected 
communities correctly, effectively preventing 
many people from accessing relief. Third, limited 
efforts were made to define responsibilities for risk 
reduction and post-disaster response for such an 
event, which was considered outside the remit of 
UNGRD because it was not a natural hazard. This 
effectively privatised responsibility to the company 
building the dam, yet the government failed to 
hold the company accountable for compensation 
or further risk reduction efforts. The lack of an 
effective response exacerbated community feelings 
of marginalisation and further undermined 
already fragile levels of trust in the government.
The 2017 landslide in Mocoa was caused by 
heavy rainfall coupled with erosion and lack of 
vegetation on the surrounding slopes. It left more 
than 300 people dead, injured or missing, with 
thousands more losing their homes. Most of the 
internally displaced and indigenous groups living 
in Mocoa were left out of disaster preparation 
activities, and their participation in rehabilitation 
planning has also been very limited. Some officials 
even maintained that these groups had no rights 
since they ‘chose’ to live in a hazard-prone area. 
In the aftermath of the landslide, many simply 
returned to the same dangerous locations, while 
others resettled in areas they considered to be at 
higher risk from future landslides. 
Both disasters illustrate that, while there has 
been a shift in political thinking to prioritise risk 
reduction, inadequate prevention and mitigation 
measures and conflicting visions of DRR between 
the state and affected citizens hamper efforts to 
build disaster resilience, as well as doing little to 
repair already fractured state–citizen relations. 
State policies that result in dispossession or 
displacement – a factor in both examples – only 
reinforce the perception of an ‘uncaring’ state. 
Top-down institutional support also contributes 
to this belief. 
Another aspect highlighted by both events is 
the importance of rights and voice and the need 
to groundtruth visions of DRR, especially in a 
country with a history of state violence against its 
citizens. This calls for a change in mindset away 
from a culture of expert-led planning and towards 
meaningful and genuinely ‘bottom-up’ dialogue 
that empowers citizens with the knowledge and 
skills they need to build more resilient livelihoods.
Recommendations
The Colombia case highlights the close 
interactions between disasters and conflict, and 
their effects on people’s lives and livelihoods. 
When the legal and institutional frameworks 
for dealing with disasters and conflict are 
compartmentalised, insufficient attention is likely 
to be paid to the ways in which vulnerabilities 
are linked. Addressing this does not warrant 
convergence of these frameworks – that would 
be legally problematic in Colombia – but it does 
require due recognition of linked vulnerabilities 
and impacts in order to better design and deliver 
DRR in conflict contexts. New challenges arising 
from the demobilisation of armed groups and 
the crisis in neighbouring Venezuela are only 
reinforcing the impetus to find more effective 
solutions. With each disaster affecting citizens 
differently, including in terms of their perceptions 
of the state, there is a need for nuanced and 
thorough consideration of conflict dynamics in 
the design and delivery of DRR. Urgent action is 
required to deepen knowledge and understanding 
of the disaster–conflict interface.
The lessons from this study yield useful 
recommendations for strengthening the 
institutional regimes dealing with ‘doubly affected’ 
citizens, both in Colombia and elsewhere.
Adopt a more community-based vision of DRR
A legally mandated and robust system for local 
consultation would enable a more integrated 
approach to DRR that addresses people’s 
demands for social justice and helps repair state–
society relations. 
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Improve coordination among agencies 
and across scales
There is an urgent need to improve coordination 
between UARIV and UNGRD to foster the 
design and delivery of disaster response and DRR 
for ‘doubly affected’ communities. This includes 
working out how to overcome existing challenges 
and avoid exacerbating mistrust between citizens 
and the state. 
Establish clear legal responsibility for DRR 
relating to man-made disasters
The Cauca floods demonstrate clearly that 
privatising responsibility does not work. On 
the contrary, there is a danger that the current 
approach will deepen the divide between people 
and the state and further entrench the strongly 
held beliefs that are undermining the social 
contract. There is therefore a need for more 
robust and punitive laws to safeguard citizens 
from such disasters.
Strengthen the underlying social contract 
and build trust
Enshrining the rights and entitlements of citizens in 
law is a critical foundation for dealing with disasters 
in areas affected by armed conflict and insecurity. 
This requires a more consultative, transparent and 
equitable DRR process that addresses people’s basic 
human rights, including protection from violence 
and disasters. Equally, better access to disaster relief 
(achieved by addressing current classifications and 
removing the need to demonstrate that people are in 
danger or deserve to receive support) will not only 
benefit people directly, it will also help build trust 
and restore faith in the state. 
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1 Introduction: ‘doble 
afectación’ 
I already lost everything when I was 
displaced due to the conflict, and now 
again [due to the landslide] 
(Maris, a woman affected by the  
Mocoa landslide).
Emerging trends in social science research on 
natural hazard-related disasters (‘disasters’) in 
conflict areas are increasingly highlighting the 
need to move beyond questions of attribution, 
which draw on large N-studies establishing 
causal links between disasters and conflicts, and 
to look past the state as the only provider of 
DRR services (Siddiqi, 2018; Peters et al., 2019). 
To understand the complex realities of disasters 
and conflict and their effects, a far more ‘multi-
dimensional, context specific and historically 
relevant understanding of climatic disasters 
and their impact on local politics’ is necessary 
(Siddiqi, 2014). 
This paper responds to the need to generate 
evidence and analysis on the ways in which 
disasters (deriving from all natural hazards, 
not just climate-related) and conflict interact. 
In the context of Colombia, this is referred to 
colloquially as ‘doble afectación’, or doubly 
affected. The paper examines the case of Colombia 
to address a seemingly simple question: what has 
been Colombia’s experience of disasters in areas 
affected by armed conflict and insurgency? 
Primary research across two scales – national 
and local – explores the institutional frameworks 
and policy regulation for DRR and conflict 
management at the national, departmental 
and municipal levels. The emphasis is on 
hazard-related disasters and, to a lesser extent, 
responses to conflict impacts. These policies 
and frameworks operate independently of each 
other, and the paper discusses the challenges this 
creates for resilience planning and improved 
human security. The paper then provides a rich 
and textured analysis of two hazard-based 
disasters in areas of armed conflict: flooding in 
Bajo Cauca and Northern Antioquia in 2018, 
which affected more than 120,000 people in 
towns along the Cauca River north of Medellín 
(Parkin, 2018); and a landslide in Mocoa, the 
capital of Putumayo Department, in 2017. The 
landslide was one of the deadliest disasters in 
Colombia in recent times: while the official 
death-toll was 333, local estimates are much 
higher, and thousands of people were displaced 
(Semana, 2018). The empirical data collected 
at this local scale enables a nuanced and finely 
tuned analysis of policy gaps and institutional 
weaknesses, while also contextualising the 
independent policy regimes around disasters and 
conflict within a much deeper and longer history 
of troubled state–society relations in peripheral 
areas of Colombia. 
The remainder of the paper is organised in 
three chapters as follows: Chapter 2 discusses 
the conflict and disaster context, policies dealing 
with DRR and, to a lesser extent, conflict, and 
the intersections between conflict and disaster. 
Chapter 3 uses empirical data to construct 
people’s ‘lived experience’ of disasters and 
conflict in Bajo Cauca and Northern Antioquia 
and Mocoa. Chapter 4 presents conclusions and 
policy recommendations.
The paper identifies five distinct areas for 
policy intervention:
 • Moving away from an over-reliance on 
technocratic, expert-led DRR towards a more 
community-based vision of DRR that allows 
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for lived experiences of conflict, both past and 
present, to be intrinsically considered.
 • Institutional capacities and disconnects – 
between centre and local, and across agencies 
of the state: who enacts DRR, formally or 
informally, in regions with legacies of violence 
and armed conflict.
 • Political classification and the politics of 
access to different types of support require a 
shift away from repeatedly needing to prove 
either deservedness or danger.
 • Establishing a clear and enforced legal 
responsibility for DRR in the context of 
anthropogenic disasters, especially when 
disaster risks are created by private actors. 
 • Strengthening the underlying social 
contract – rights, duties and responsibilities, 
underpinned by considerations of voice, 
empowerment and accountability. 
1.1 Methodology and approach
This paper draws on a range of methods and 
data, including a review of secondary literature, 
analysis of policy documents, primary qualitative 
data and analysis of media articles. Primary data 
was collected between November and December 
2018. Efforts were made to include extracts from 
the interviews throughout the report to bring the 
events to life and help convey the diverse ways in 
which disaster risk is framed and communicated. 
Interviews with policy-makers were conducted 
primarily in Bogotá and Mocoa, and interviews 
with community members took place in Mocoa and 
four towns in Northern Antioquia (Sabanalarga, 
Toledo, Ituango and Puerto Valdivia).1 Fieldwork 
in Northern Antioquia is complicated for non-
Colombians due to accessibility and security 
issues, and international observers were 
accompanied to the most heavily affected towns 
by a local civil society organisation, Rios Vivos. 
This method of engaging with flood-affected 
residents in Northern Antioquia enabled the 
researchers to document the testimonies of residents 
and conduct individual interviews in communities 
1 More than 30 interviews took place with over 61 respondents, including policy-makers and government representatives 
in Bogotá and Mocoa (including UNGRD), international and national operantional agencies (including the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Oxfam, the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)). ‘Town hall’ meetings were organised in Sabanalarga, Toledo, Ituango and Puerto Valdivia.
where people receive frequent and regular death 
threats. However, the reliance on an activist civil 
society organisation also meant that the researchers 
primarily engaged with interviewees associated 
with a specific political agenda (in this instance 
opposition to a large dam on the Cauca River).  
The research team acknowledges the potential 
impact of this perspective on data collection.  
In addition to fieldwork in affected communities, 
the research analysed the key pieces of legislation 
institutionalising responsibilities for reducing 
disaster risk, including Decree 4147, which 
formalised the UNGRD as the national institution 
dealing with risk reduction, and Law 1523 
(passed in 2012) establishing the Sistema Nacional 
de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National 
Disaster Risk Management System (SNGRD) – see 
Figure 2). Finally, the research team conducted 
a media analysis covering three of Colombia’s 
most widely circulated newspapers: El Tiempo, 
El Espectador and El Colombiano. The analysis 
was undertaken from the day of the two disasters 
and over the subsequent 30 days, and included 
all articles on this subject published within that 
period. The data was used to triangulate and 
contextualise the findings from other sources 
within the wider national and regional narrative.











2 The interface between 
conflict and disasters  
in Colombia
2.1 The conflict context
In November 2016, the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército 
del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia – People’s Army (FARC)) and the 
Colombian government signed a historic peace 
deal following 52 years of conflict. The FARC, 
founded in the mid-1960s, claimed to represent 
the interests of poor campesinos (peasants), 
but from the early 1980s began financing its 
operations through the illegal drug trade, as 
well as extortion of businesses and kidnapping 
(InSight Crime, 2017). Peace negotiations with 
the government began in 2012, leading to 
the group’s demobilisation in 2016. In 2017 
FARC became an official political party, the 
Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionario del Común 
(Common Alternative Revolutionary Force). 
Despite the peace agreement with the FARC, 
Colombia cannot be considered a post-conflict 
country, and an array of armed groups remain 
active. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(National Liberation Army (ELN)) engages in 
drug-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, 
as well as attacks on infrastructure, including 
oil pipelines. Paramilitary groups established 
in the 1980s to protect wealthy landowners 
and drug-traffickers have also been involved 
in drug-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. 
These groups, under a loose coalition known 
as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(United Self-Defenders of Colombia (AUC)), 
demobilised in 2006, but many continue to 
operate as bandas criminales (‘criminal bands’ 
(BACRIM)). Alongside dissident FARC fighters 
and international drug cartels, they compete 
violently for control over coca cultivation and 
trafficking routes.
Throughout the conflict, civilians have 
endured violence, large-scale forced displacement 
(15% of Colombia’s population are internally 
displaced), human rights abuses, targeted killings, 
including of activists and community leaders, and 
kidnapping. Official figures count 8.7 million 
registered victims, including more than 7 million 
forcibly displaced, 267,000 killed and 47,000 
disappeared (Unidad para las Víctimas, 2018). 
Hundreds of social leaders and ‘environmental 
defenders’ have been murdered and thousands 
more threatened. Conflict between Colombia’s 
various armed groups leaves civilians injured or 
killed and property damaged (see, for example, 
RCN, 2018). Endemic violence is taking place 
against a backdrop of deep poverty and income 
inequality, notably a disparity between urban and 
rural areas. Rural Colombians suffer from a lack 
of education and employment opportunities, and 
unsustainable farming and climate conditions 
have left large numbers of people in agricultural 
communities with only two viable livelihood 
choices: either migration to cities or joining one 
of the country’s armed groups. The Venezuelan 
migrant crisis is putting further strain on service 
provision (UNHCR, 2018).
In 2011, under ‘mounting pressure from 
domestic and international human rights groups 
as well as the Colombian Constitutional Court’, 
the government passed Law 1448 – the Victims’ 
Law. This led in 2012 to the creation of the 
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UARIV, charged with providing assistance and 
reparations to victims of the armed conflict, 
including economic payments, land restitution, 
education and healthcare and access to housing. 
Given that almost one-fifth of Colombia’s 
population is registered with the UARIV, the 
government’s response has perhaps unsurprisingly 
been uneven. In August 2017, a progress 
report noted that, between 2009 and 2016, the 
government had offered reparations to 580,415 
people, or 7% of the population (Zulver, 2018). 
2.2 Hazards and the policy 
landscape for DRR
Colombia is one of the most hazard-prone 
countries in Latin America: it is highly exposed 
to a range of hazards, including cyclones, coastal 
and river flooding, earthquakes, landslides and 
volcanic activity. Some 84% of the population and 
86% of assets are exposed to at least two hazards 
(GFDRR, 2019). Against this background, the 
government has made significant strides over the 
years in implementing more effective disaster risk 
management frameworks. Even so, for a range 
of reasons, major disaster events still exceed the 
national capacity to respond.
Colombia has followed a well-trodden path 
in developing its legal, institutional and financial 
capacity for DRR, beginning with response and 
then moving to greater consideration of ex-ante 
measures. Reforms have been prompted by major 
disaster events, coupled with public criticism of 
inadequate state responses. Prior to 1948, the 
dominant paradigm was local-scale action on 
disaster management supported by municipal 
fire brigades (Zeiderman, 2012). In 1948, the 
assassination of populist political leader Jorge 
Eliecer Gaitan and subsequent violence in Bogotá 
led to the establishment of the Socorro Nacional de 
la Cruz Roja, responsible for national emergency 
response (Ramirez Gomez and Cardona, 1996, in 
Zeiderman, 2012: 1576). In the 1960s, influenced 
by USAID and Cold War politics, civil defence 
entities were established across Latin America, 
including in Colombia. Their aim was to maintain 
social and political stability, and as such they 
were mandated to respond to both natural 
hazard-related and man-made disasters (Ramirez 
Gomez and Cardona, 1996, in Zeiderman, 2012). 
By 1979, Emergency Management Committees 
had been established across Colombia (Hernandez 
Vargas, 2014). In 1979, Law 9 established the 
Comité Natconal de Emergencias (National 
Emergency Committee), responsible for declaring 
emergency situations and coordinating the 
response. There were also efforts to encourage 
preparedness through the development of local 
contingency plans tailored to local risk profiles. 
A notable shift came in 1984 following the 
1983 Popayan earthquake. Decree 1547 saw 
the establishment of the Fondo Nacional de 
Calamidades (National Calamities Fund), designed 
to provide the financial resources to support relief 
and reconstruction, as well as aspects of disaster 
prevention (Hernandez Vargas, 2014). 
Civil defence forces responded to the Nevado 
del Ruiz eruption and the siege of the Palace 
of Justice in Bogotá in 1985. Despite their 
significantly different origins, these two events 
marked a shift towards ex-ante risk management 
and the institutional separation of political or 
military threats (the responsibility of the country’s 
security agencies) from risk management related 
to natural hazards (the responsibility of technical 
agencies such as the Sistema Nacional para la 
Prevención y Atención de Desastres (National 
System for Disaster Prevention and Response) 
(SNPAD), established in 1988, the Red Cross and 
the National Institute of Geological Study and 
Mining) (Zeiderman, 2012: 1577). In effect, ‘the 
legal and policy framework underpinning disaster 
management in Colombia divided the world of 
potential threats and emergencies into those with 
human and nonhuman cause’ (Zeiderman, 2012: 
1578). This distinction between ‘natural’ disasters 
and issues associated with conflict and societal 
instability mirrored the international discourse on 
disasters, which maintained (and still does, to a 
large degree) the same separation.
Law 919 of 1989 modified the Dirección de 
Prevención y Atención de Desastres into a body 
responsible for risk management under the 
Dirección de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres 
para la Prevención y Atención de Desastres. In 
practice, this saw the beginning of risk mitigation 
activities at the city and town level (Hernandez 
Vargas, 2014: 41). Up to the late 1980s, major 
changes to disaster policy reflected actual and 
perceived failures of risk management following 
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major events. This continued through the 2000s, 
as moves towards risk reduction took place faster 
on paper than in practice. 
Following a year of excessive rainfall related 
to La Niña, flooding in 2010–11 was declared a 
national emergency, highlighting to civilians and 
risk management institutions alike the stark need 
to improve DRR. Alongside action to address 
the floods – including 37 legislative decrees – the 
government updated the legal and institutional 
structures for DRR, though changes to disaster 
policy have largely been characterised by reactive 
policy-making in the post-disaster space. Between 
1971 and 2011 at least 24 policy documents 
were issued related to disaster risk management, 
primarily triggered by specific hazard events 
(Campos et al., 2011: 78). 
Decree 4147 in 2011 formalised the UNGRD 
as the national institution dealing with risk 
reduction. The UNGRD, which sits within the 
Ministry of Interior, an office reporting directly to 
the President, assumed responsibility for designing 
and delivering policies and implementing 
programmes. This includes coordination 
and operationalisation of the SNGRD, the 
successor to the SNPAD, with a stronger focus 
on disaster reduction and prevention. With a 
mandate down to the municipal level, this new 
architecture encompasses a comprehensive 
set of accompanying bodies and coordination 
structures. In addition, Law 1523, passed in 
2012, mandates local authorities to undertake 
hazard and risk identification, and to take these 
findings into consideration in land-use plans. 
Emergency mechanisms and data collection at 
the local level are supported by the SNGRD 
and by the Fondo Nacional de Gestion del 
Riesgo de Desastres (National Fund for Disaster 
Risk Management). The government has also 
endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, indicating the political importance 
attached to this agenda. As an extension of the 
political commitment to DRR, Colombia’s vision 
for risk reduction is articulated in a 10-year DRR 
plan, the Plan Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de 
Desastres 2015–2025 (Government of Colombia, 
2015). This outlines an ambitious set of targets 
for achieving a significant reduction in disaster 
mortality, the economic impact of disasters and 
the number of people affected. 
On paper at least, the establishment of the 
UNGRD and SNGRD and the 10-year plan 
reflect a radical move away from a focus on 
response and preparedness to a system which 
understands and seeks to act on risk reduction 
holistically, across scales and sectors and across 
the risk management cycle. In practice, however, 
even the basics of preparedness and response 
still fall short. Multiple actors are engaged in 
response operations, with varying degrees of 
effectiveness. Civil Defence, the Colombian 
Red Cross and the Fire Department have all 
responded promptly to numerous hazard events, 
but major disasters – such as the 2010–11 
La Niña floods, which led to 400 deaths and 
affected 3 million people – continue to exceed 
national capacity. Funding to actually deliver 
national and subnational risk management 
plans is lacking, and recovery, prevention 
and mitigation actions are not systematically 
implemented. Patronage and clientelism hamper 
efforts to pursue effective DRR across the 
country and corruption undermines government 
functioning across the board, including the 
SNGRD (Hernandez Vargas, 2014: 24). This 
affects all stages of DRR, from the diversion of 
response funds through to mismanagement of 
land zoning. Irregularities in the distribution of 
disaster response aid have been documented, 
including for political ends (Hernandez Vargas, 
2014: 25), while political interest influences the 
willingness and ability of subnational entities 
to enforce land-use policies. Where ex-ante risk 
reduction has been pursued this tends to be via 
hard infrastructure, rather than efforts to reduce 
systemic risk through engaging with communities 
and building local capacity.
2.3 The conflict–disaster interface
The combination of Colombia’s turbulent and 
violent political history and high exposure to 
a range of hazards means that conflict looms 
large as a root cause of disaster risk, and as 
the operational context in which disaster risk 
management is delivered. The disaster–conflict 
nexus also presents significant challenges to 
the ability of local and national governments 
to deliver on Sendai Framework ambitions. 
Currently, however, approaches to disaster and 
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Figure 2 The evolution of DRR in Colombia
2 3
1948
Assassination of popularist 
political leader and 
ensuing revolt which left 
Bogota in ruins prompted 
the introduction of the 
Red Cross in Colombia to 
respond to the crisis.
1960
Creation of Civil Defence 
– aided by USAID support 
– to respond to ‘accidental 
or non-human origin 
disasters to prevent social 
and political instability’ 
(Zeiderman, 2012).
1979
Colombia Pacific Coast tsunami 
in Tumaco. The government 
created a Disaster Response 
System and established local to 
national disaster management 
institutions for disaster 
preparedness and management.
1985
Nevado del Ruiz volcano and guerrilla 
siege of the Palace of Justice in 
Bogotá marked a legal, political and 
moral shift by the Colombian state 
towards ‘anticipatory logics of risk 
management’ (Zeiderman, 2012).
1986
National Office of Emergency Response 
created with support from UNDP. 
Selected key policy moments, events and legislation 
1983
Civil Defence responded to the Popayan 
mega disaster – a volcanic eruption 
triggering an avalanche and earthquakes.
The evolution of disaster risk 
reduction in Colombia 
1988
Government of Colombia created the National 
Disaster Preparedness and Response System 
(SNPAD), indicating a broader approach to DRM. 
The SNPAD was responsible for disaster prevention 
and management across the country, bringing 
together public and private institutions. This also 
marked the separation of natural and anthropogenic 
disasters from those related to conflict. 
1999
Following the Armenia earthquake, the government began to more systematically record 
disaster impacts data. 
1999 National Plan for Disaster Prevention and Response (PNPAD) or Conpes 3146 
established, promoting comprehensive risk reduction with an emphasis on decentralised 
risk management responsibilities at subnational level. 
Government of Colombia begins ongoing collaboration with the World Bank, which 
provides financial and technical support to a range of DRR initiatives including probabilistic 
risk modelling, infrastructure, capacity analysis and innovative financial mechanisms.
2005
Colombia endorsed the Hyogo Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction. 
2010–2011 
La Niña-related flooding across 
the country lasted for 10 
months, with significant impacts 
on the population and economy. 
As part of the National Calamity 
Fund, Humanitarian Colombia 
was established to administer 
response and rehabilitation 
funds (Campos et al., 2011).
2012
The SNPAD was replaced with 
the National Disaster Risk 
Management System (SNGRD). 
Law 1523 was passed, adopting 
a new national DRR policy and 
establishing a national system 
for managing disaster risk.
Colombia submitted a Hyogo 
Framework progress report 
for the period 2011–2012 
(Government of Colombia, 2012).
2014
The 2014 National Policy for 
Disaster Risk Management 
implemented in part through 
the National Development 
Plan 2014–2018 – with 
fiscal risk management a 
priority, alongside reducing 
loss of life, asset exposure, 
financial rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. 
Colombia submitted a 
Hyogo Framework progress 
report for the period 
2013–2014 (Government of 
Colombia, 2014a).
2015
Colombia endorsed the Sendai 
Framework for Action on Disaster 
Risk Reduction.
Colombia launched its Plan 
Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo 
de Desastres 2015–2025 
(Government of Colombia, 2015b), 
to be delivered by the UNGRD.
2017
Colombia participated 
in the 2017 Global 
Platform for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, and 
undertook a Sendai 
Framework Readiness 
Review (Government 
of Colombia, 2017).  
2018
Hosted in Colombia, President Santos opened the 6th Regional 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas and 3rd High-
level Meeting of Ministers and Authorities on the Implementation of 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in 
the Americas and the Caribbean.
2011
Law 4147 aimed to 




Unidad Nacional para 
la Gestión del Riesgo 
de Desastres (UNGRD).
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conflict risk are disconnected from each other; 
there are notable legal and institutional cultures 
that maintain this separation (Peters, 2017), 
and no efforts have been made to integrate 
consideration of conflict dynamics into DRR 
(Wong, 2008). The legal frameworks governing 
UNARIV and the UNGRD are entirely discrete 
and unrelated. ‘Natural disasters’ are mentioned 
just once in the accord between the government 
and the FARC, in the context of evacuation 
responsibilities in designated demobilisation 
zones, and ‘armed conflict’ and ‘displacement’ do 
not feature at all in the text of Law 1523. While 
there is a rationale for this separation – it would 
arguably have been politically impossible to 
enshrine the disaster management system within 
the politics of conflict in Colombia given how 
disaster management laws have evolved over the 
past 50 years – this does not reflect the complex 
daily reality of living with conflict and disasters. 
The coincidence of disasters and conflict is 
increasingly seen as creating a ‘double effect’. 
Displacement, for example, leads to a loss of 
productive assets, severely disrupts people’s social 
networks and social safety nets and cuts them off 
from financial, social and livelihood opportunities, 
leaving them highly vulnerable to future shocks 
(Pinto et al., 2014). In many Colombian cities, 
peasant communities forced to flee violence are 
living in ‘high-risk conditions … hanging on 
unstable hillsides or occupying flood zones 
on the banks of rivers, streams or wetlands’ 
(Wilches-Chaux, 2018). Likewise, people fleeing 
conflict in Bajo Putumayo and settling in Mocoa 
were forced to find shelter in an area of the city 
prone to landslides because they had no other 
option, thereby increasing their vulnerability; as 
one former government official in Putumayo put 
it in an interview for this study, ‘the poor and 
marginalised always live in vulnerable areas, in 
this case it was the displaced [from the conflict]’. 
People fleeing conflict are also more suspicious 
of the military personnel who provide rescue 
and relief. One study (Fraser, 2016) reports that 
a lack of trust in state risk management agencies 
as a result of the conflict has undermined risk 
communication and response efforts. Many areas, 
including those with a history of conflict and 
home to conflict-displaced populations, lack basic 
capacity to transition from disaster preparedness 
and response to ex-ante risk reduction, and 
channelling resources to the local level – even 
where there is the political appetite to do so – is 
particularly difficult in conflict-affected areas 
(Stirk, 2013: 13); following the 2010–11 floods 
‘[a]n estimated 40% of affected people in some 
areas had still not received assistance one year 
after the floods first hit’ (ibid.). Operational 
agencies spoke of the challenges of building 
disaster resilience in contexts where the state 
has little or no presence, where capacities at the 
local level are lacking and where, as one Oxfam 
staff member put it in an interview, there may 
be ‘a breakdown of social fabric due to armed 
conflict’. There are also issues of intersectionality, 
with greater disaster impacts on marginalised and 
indigenous groups and disproportionate effects 
on women and girls, in part related to sexual 
and gender-based violence associated with both 
natural hazard- and conflict-related emergencies. 
In circumstances such as these, the connections 
between the impacts of natural hazard-related 
disasters and violent conflict seem self-evident.
Despite Colombia’s long history of violence, 
conflict dynamics have been neglected in the 
institutional framework of disaster management. 
A keyword search of the current Plan Nacional 
de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres 2015–2025 
(Government of Colombia, 2015) found none 
of the following terms: conflict, IDP, violence, 
armed, FARC or war (guerra). The word 
‘peace’ appears once, in relation to education 
programmes. Thus, considerations of conflict 
are essentially non-existent in the formal DRR 
architecture, despite being a major inhibitor of 
progress. It is unlikely that the ambitions set 
out within the current 10-year plan – including 
that every municipality and department 
has incorporated risk management in their 
development plans – will be achieved without 
specific consideration of how to enact DRR at 
the subnational level, including in areas currently 
under the control of non-state armed groups. 
There is widespread acknowledgement that 
pursuing DRR is more challenging in contexts 
of conflict, where institutions may be weaker 
and there is a lower level of state capacity 
(Siddiqi, 2018; Peters and Peters, 2018). 
Several interviewees cited negative incentives 
– electorally, it is not attractive to invest in 
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prevention and preparedness, relative to response 
and reconstruction. This is a well-documented 
challenge for DRR, often resulting in cost–benefit 
studies seeking to create a convincing case that 
ex-ante investment outweighs ex-post. 
Research by Gallego (forthcoming) found that, 
during the 2010–11 rains, locations more severely 
affected by the disaster saw an increase in violence 
by the FARC and paramilitaries. When patterns 
of violence were analysed, a strong connection 
was found between the violence and the location 
and type of aid. Broadly, in contexts receiving 
relief – food, hygiene kits – FARC violence 
increased. In contexts receiving reconstruction aid 
– bridges, roads, schools – paramilitary violence 
increased. Gallego (forthcoming) suggests that, 
for the FARC, relief is more attractive – resources 
can be captured to weaken the state – whereas 
paramilitaries are trying to ‘capture the state 
from the inside’, making alliances with local 
politicians, so reconstruction aid in the form of 
contracts provides different types of incentives and 
opportunities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the types of contracts and processes used for the 
distribution of disaster mitigation and prevention 
undergo more supervision (i.e. audits), reducing 
the scope for manipulation relative to emergency 
2 Interview with Jorge Gallego.
aid, where politicians and mayors may have 
more discretion when distributing cash and relief 
immediately after a disaster. 
Conventional wisdom states that disasters 
signal a politician’s competence by providing a 
stage on which to test their ability to manage 
a crisis. According to this logic, an incumbent 
has a higher chance of being re-elected because 
well-managed responses will be rewarded with 
re-election. The case of disasters in Colombia 
challenges this logic. Rather than competence, it 
is the availability of manipulatable resources – 
through aid – that provides the means through 
which to secure votes: ‘it’s because you have a 
positive shock on the budget to buy votes’.2 If 
this holds true, in contexts where resources are 
likely to be manipulated for political gain and/or 
where elections are impending, normative DRR 
discourse which promotes decentralised decision-
making and resource distribution may require 
rethinking. It may be necessary to consider having 
an independent agency in charge of allocating 
funds and contracts, which can provide a degree 
of independence from political interference or 
mechanisms to enable community-led decision-
making and stronger processes for transparency 
and accountability to those affected.
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3 On the ground: the 




This chapter explores people’s experience of 
disasters and conflict in the two case study 
locations: Bajo Cauca and Northern Antioquia, 
which was affected by large-scale flooding in 
May 2018, and Mocoa, the capital of Putumayo, 
where a landslide killed more than 300 people  
in the early hours of 1 April 2017. 
3.1 Floods in Bajo Cauca  
and Northern Antioquia
Bajo Cauca, a sub-region of Antioquia 
Department, comprises six municipalities. 
The main economic activities are mining, 
cattle ranching and agriculture (rice, corn and 
plantain). There is also coca cultivation. The 
region has experienced violence for decades, 
including homicide, torture, disappearances 
and forced displacement. The late 1990s were 
particularly bloody, with massacres of civilians 
by paramilitary groups, including in El Aro and 
La Granja (in Ituango municipality) (Rutas del 
Conflicto, 2018). The ELN, dissident FARC 
members and Mexican cartels remain active 
in the area, and murder rates have increased 
dramatically as armed factions struggle for 
control of coca cultivation and drug-trafficking 
routes (Ávila, 2018). 
The floods in May 2018 destroyed bridges, 
schools and health centres and made hundreds 
of people homeless (Parkin Daniels, 2018). While 
resettlement housing has been built for some 
affected families and new evacuation routes 
have been marked, at the time of the fieldwork 
in November 2018 people were still living in 
makeshift housing (such as a sports complex) 
in Ituango. Neighbourhoods in Puerto Valdivia, 
the town most affected by the flooding, had 
been entirely destroyed by the flood waters and 
were deemed unsafe. Houses were marked with 
red stickers by the local municipality, with the 
words ‘no retorno’. The health centre and school 
destroyed by the flood waters had not been rebuilt, 
and the SNGRD office had closed several months 
before the fieldwork for this study took place. 
The floods were the result of structural failures 
in the construction of a mega-dam on the Cauca 
River. This is widely touted as Colombia’s largest 
infrastructure project, expected to cost upwards 
of $5.5 billion.3 The project, which is designed 
to harness the potential of hydroelectricity on 
the Cauca River, has affected numerous towns, 
villages and other riverine settlements. Because 
the dam is being built on the site of some of the 
worst massacres of the 1990s, it is likely that 
its reservoir has already flooded, or will flood, 
mass graves of victims killed at the height of 
the violence.4 The company responsible for the 
construction of the dam, the Colombian utility 
group EPM (Empresas Públicas de Medellín), has 
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already exhumed and relocated 300 bodies,5 but 
it is believed that many still remain unrecovered; 
the local press has reported that the European 
Parliament asked dam construction to be delayed 
so that bodies could be exhumed, but the request 
was ignored.6
Virtually no one the study spoke to was able 
to clearly articulate whether precautionary risk 
reduction measures or post-disaster response was 
the responsibility of the state authorities or the 
company in charge of building the dam. To some 
extent, this confusion was also evident at the 
highest state levels: according to the newspaper 
El Tiempo, the government stated that EPM 
was responsible for the emergency and ‘should 
provide explanations’. While then-President 
Juan Manuel Santos announced that he would 
activate the SNGRD national disaster response 
system, EPM was still apparently regarded as the 
responsible party (El Tiempo, 2018).
There is a general understanding in the 
literature on disasters that declaring a hazard-
based event an ‘emergency’ or ‘disaster’ is a 
profoundly political act (Klein, 2008; Ophir, 
2010; Warner, 2013). States need to ‘invoke 
exceptionality’, the act of catastrophising, to 
‘serve humanitarian but also utilitarian political 
instrumentality’. This is because disasters help 
to maintain state legitimacy – what Warner 
(2013) calls the ‘barbarian at the gates’ narrative 
– as they legitimise the authority and value of 
strong state institutions that can respond to 
such challenges. At the same time Warner also 
presents exceptions to this rule, where states have 
abandoned the official category of disaster to 
refer to recurring and repeated natural hazards, 
for example droughts in Australia. However, this 
‘de-catastrophisation’ of disasters may mean that 
citizens cannot access the resources and services 
that are made available in a declared disaster, 
leaving people feeling abandoned by the state 
and potentially damaging state–society relations 
(Raleigh, 2010). 
The civil society organisation leading the 
movement against the dam, Rios Vivos, claimed 
that this was not a ‘natural’ disaster, but also 
5 www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/colombia-river-cauca-breach-flooding-farc.
6 www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/que-es-y-donde-queda-ituango-antioquia-218974.
made the wider point that ‘because in Colombia 
they don’t know what to do with anthropogenic 
disasters, who to blame, they don’t know what 
to do – there is a piece of legislature clearly 
to do with natural disasters. It says who is in 
charge’. According to the head of Rios Vivos, 
the state was either unwilling or unable to 
categorise affected people in ways that genuinely 
enabled them to access, and make claims on, 
the state. Law 1523 of 2012 states that a ‘public 
calamity’ should be declared when natural 
events occur causing material, economic or 
environmental losses (Restrepo, 2018). However, 
the state governor of Antioquia famously ‘de-
catastrophised’ the disaster by referring to it as 
a ‘minor impasse’ (Parkin Daniels, 2018). As 
another interviewee put it, the state’s failure to 
declare a ‘public calamity’ meant that it could 
avoid responsibility for the response: 
But this wasn’t a natural disaster. The 
municipality said that EPM should be 
in charge of rescue and relief, EPM said 
it should be the municipality. According 
to legislation, the municipality should 
be the first responder. But when it’s not 
the state that creates the tragedy, then 
it needn’t be the state that responds. 
And so, we are left in a limbo, everyone 
washes their hands of us … the 
UNGRD says that judicially it wasn’t 
natural and so it isn’t within their 
remit. They leave us like crazy people.
Certainly, to some extent ‘de-catastrophising’ 
the disaster enabled the Colombian state to 
‘privatise responsibility’ (Ilcan, 2009) to EPM. 
Yet the company was not compelled to engage in 
any further risk reduction measures for people 
whose livelihoods or assets had been damaged or 
destroyed. The general narrative on the ground 
was that these communities had to continue to 
live with these vulnerabilities. 
The question of compensation is a complicated 
issue in the conflict-afflicted context of Bajo Cauca. 
People who are categorised as desplazados 
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(displaced due to violence) are registered by 
the personeros (local ombudsman) when they 
arrive at the location they have been displaced 
to. According to interviewees from Rios Vivos, 
when people arrived as damnificados (disaster-
affected – though almost everyone had been 
displaced multiples times by conflict in the 
past), they were incorrectly registered by the 
personeros as displaced due to violence, simply 
because that is the category they are most used 
to registering. This seemingly inconsequential 
error in categorisation had serious repercussions 
because of the separation between the UNGRD 
and UARIV policy regimes. Once it became 
obvious that these affected individuals were not 
from an area currently undergoing conflict they 
were subsequently struck off the list and were 
not entitled to any rehabilitation assistance. As 
the head of Rios Vivos emphasised:
This displacement isn’t related to the 
conflict, so it doesn’t correspond to the 
UARIV. When you talk about evictions 
related to the floods, they say they 
have nothing to do with it. And since 
this is a vacuum [of policy], it is the 
companies that benefit. No one is in 
charge of anything. And us? Since the 
first displacement in 2013 [because 
of dam- related hazards], we haven’t 
got anywhere with the UARIV. It’s 
complicated, they say it’s difficult. They 
say, go and make your declarations, 
say whether it was the paramilitaries 
or the FARC who displaced you. But 
we won’t go and lie, it wasn’t either of 
these groups. And we say that it was 
something else, and they don’t know 
what to do with us. 
Testimonies gathered through four town 
hall-style meetings, followed up by individual 
interviews, show how the history of armed 
conflict, displacement and dispossession due to 
the flooding disaster constitutes a continuum 
of violence in people’s lives. In effect, the flood 
is seen as part of the same process of denial of 
rights and marginalisation that people in Bajo 
Cauca feel for being ‘campesinos’ and regarded 
as ‘FARC sympathisers’. People in this part of 
the country are no strangers to state violence at 
the hands of paramilitary forces during the dark 
years at the peak of the armed conflict, or at the 
very least they believe the state looked the other 
way when these atrocities were being committed. 
The narrative around the flooding of the Cauca 
River that our interviewees were constructing – 
no doubt with the help of an activist movement 
such as Rios Vivos – was that this disaster was 
a continuation of violence through other means. 
Similar arguments have been made elsewhere. 
Branch (2018: 306), for example, has called for 
disasters in conflict contexts to be recast as a 
product of ‘ongoing, longstanding multiscalar 
processes of devastation produced by histories 
of human engagement with the environment, 
including that of war’. In this light, disasters are 
the outcome of histories and lived experiences 
in specific contexts, and call for greater 
consideration of the way political violence and 
destructive environmental change intertwine.
In interviews, there was a clear implication 
that the state was acting as an enabling agent 
for EPM, much as it had for decades enabled 
paramilitaries to prosecute the war against 
guerrilla groups. During fieldwork, researchers 
encountered numerous individuals who had 
survived or fled massacres in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in Northern Antioquia. Their story 
of the floods was part of this wider narrative. As 
one man in Puerto Valdivia put it, ‘we have lived 
with massacres our whole lives’. In the town hall 
meeting in Toledo, one woman said that, even 
when people began to arrive at town meetings 
in the early days after the floods, they were 
unable to find the words to speak up: after being 
terrorised by the conflict for so long, they had 
no idea how to write petitions and engage with 
the state. The fact that these devastating floods 
were another chapter in the wider story of state 
marginalisation and oppression of people who 
consider themselves campesinos was never far 
from the surface of these conversations.
In some interviews anger towards the state 
was palpable. One middle-aged woman told us 
how, over the past 25 years, she had lost three 
family members to the conflict. Her husband 
had disappeared and was presumed killed, and 
two of her brothers had been tortured and killed 
by forces believed to be paramilitaries. She was 
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emphatic in stating that the armed conflict was 
linked to the flooding in May 2018, through the 
dam. Her distrust of these forces, and the state’s 
complicity in creating the space for violence 
and relative impunity, ran so deep that she 
went so far as to suggest that the paramilitaries 
killed all the young men who could present a 
challenge to the construction of the dam. After 
that ‘the company’ came in: ‘The state helped the 
company – you can’t see it any other way. They 
have killed many, many men’. In this context, 
where the relationship between the state and its 
citizens is fractured, policy frameworks for DRR 
are unlikely to have the positive impact desired 
if rolled out in a ‘business as usual’ manner and 
without systematic consideration of the fact that 
the state is often seen with great distrust and has 
limited credibility in these communities.
Finally, the floods in May 2018 damaged 
the local ecology in ways that the state DRR 
architecture, run by formal laws and frameworks, 
is not necessarily sensitive to. The head of the 
Rios Vivos movement spoke frequently of the 
ideological divide between the movement’s 
members and the state, particularly the latter’s 
vision for development. In one conversation, she 
said that EPM had tried to promote a narrative 
that there were no people there and that the 
area was just ‘wilderness’. For the movement, 
then, resisting the dam is also about resisting 
hegemonic narratives of marginalisation. It was 
eloquently argued that dismantling Hidroelctrico 
Ituango is about more than just the dam: it is 
about dismantling the ideologies driving it in the 
first place.  
Nowhere was this clearer than in the town 
hall meeting in Toledo. Every single resident who 
spoke about their experience of the floods, and 
gave their testimony of damage and destruction, 
first and foremost spoke of the devastating 
impact on the local ecology and the destruction 
of habitats. Residents also told the study that 
tress had been cut down to make way for coca 
production, fuelling conflict and increasing 
vulnerability to flooding. (The local research team 
from Bogotá needed translation help because, as 
non-natives to the area, they were unfamiliar with 
the names of the animals and plants residents were 
at pains to record had been destroyed.) 
3.2 The landslide in Mocoa
Located in the south of the country, along the 
border with Ecuador, Putumayo has been one 
of the departments most affected by violent 
conflict in Colombia. According to a report by 
the National Centre for Historical Memory 
(2012: 17): ‘for more than two decades, the 
civilian population has been stigmatised as 
either guerrilla or paramilitary [sympathisers], 
according to where they lived, and has been 
the victim of multiple and atrocious repertoires 
of violence’. Coca cultivation began in the 
1970s, attracting at various points the FARC, 
paramilitaries and narco-traffickers. The FARC 
established control in 1991, but in the late 
1990s the AUC returned to the region, and 
between 1999 and 2006 engaged in horrific 
massacres in towns such as El Tigre and El 
Placer (ibid.). Torture, sexual violence, murder 
and disappearances were common. People 
fleeing the violence headed for Mocoa, a city 
that historically had not been under the control 
of armed groups: almost 140,000 people were 
displaced within the department, and 60% of 
Mocoa’s current population comprises conflict 
victims (Ávila Cortés, 2018a). 
The landslide on 1 April 2017, which left 
hundreds dead, injured or missing, has been 
called a ‘compound disaster’ (Cheng et al., 2018). 
Remote sensing and satellite imaging revealed 
that a range of hazards, from the heavy rains 
that started the previous night to droughts a few 
years before, which reduced vegetation cover, and 
erosion came together to result in the landslide 
(ibid.). The landslide was also experienced as 
a ‘compound disaster’ by the people affected: 
according to the mayor of Mocoa, 80% of the 
victims were also victims of armed conflict. 
Active and sustained DRR measures to reduce 
and manage hazard-based risk were largely 
absent in Mocoa prior to the landslide. During 
the disaster a significant response operation 
was activated, and after it the construction of 
a terraced housing estate provided homes for a 
number of affected families in the neighbourhood 
of Villa Aurora, on the outskirts of the city. In 
San Miguel, the neighbourhood most severely 
affected by the landslide, evacuation routes were 
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visible when this research was carried out two 
years after the event. Yet there were families who 
were not resettled, and people have returned 
to San Miguel with seemingly little improved 
knowledge or capacity for preparedness or 
response. The municipality’s attempts to use 
construction equipment to dig channels to direct 
water flow in the event of another hazard event 
are widely regarded as ill-chosen and redundant. 
In the aftermath of the disaster an interesting 
and unique link was established between the 
UNGRD and UARIV. There is evidence to suggest 
that the landslide, and the media and public 
attention the response received, prompted the 
UNGRD and UARIV to coordinate and expedite 
reparations to residents who were ‘doubly 
affected’. This allowed those affected by the 
disaster to access funds to support the rebuilding 
of their lives and livelihoods, but also caused 
resentment among those waiting for support from 
UARIV. Individuals who had received reparations 
from UARIV and used them to invest in homes 
in the San Miguel area which were subsequently 
destroyed were not entitled to further payments. 
Zeiderman’s (2012) work on Bogotá 
meticulously documents how the state at 
municipal level demarcates ‘zones of high risk’ 
and attempts to resettle people living in exposed 
areas. People, especially those who have been 
displaced numerous times by armed conflict, as 
many of our interviewees in Mocoa had been, 
were obviously weary of government officials 
arriving on their doorsteps talking about hazards 
and risk in a way that may result in further 
displacement. In Zeiderman’s (2012: 1583) 
words: ‘there is noticeable hostility [towards 
government technicians recording dangerous 
cracks in walls]. Experience might lead people to 
assume that if government officials are knocking 
on doors today, they will be delivering eviction 
notices tomorrow’. Zeiderman’s point, and 
one supported by the Mocoa experience, is the 
oversimplification and misconception that people 
insist on living in risky areas exposed to natural 
hazards, and refuse to relocate when they are 
asked to do so. 
Although there is little evidence that there 
were active ex-ante risk reduction measures by 
the municipal government in Mocoa, the idea 
that residents in more vulnerable and poorer 
neighbourhoods do not perceive and understand 
risk adequately and are stubborn runs deep 
through government and local narratives. 
According to the mayor of Mocoa, despite the 
municipal government trying its best to dissuade 
people from returning to risky, damaged houses 
after the landslide, ‘even today, after what 
happened, people still insist on returning to these 
areas’. Andreas, a local social media celebrity, 
said that his family had lived in a landslide-
affected neighbourhood in Mocoa, Los Pinos, for 
two generations. He was of the view that there 
had been a landslide 60 years ago, and therefore 
his family should have been more aware of the 
risk, but it was seldom discussed: ‘I do not know 
why older people are not conscious of the risk 
levels that they are exposed to. So, they did not 
pay that much attention to it’. Gabriela, who 
found herself in the affected neighbourhood 
of San Miguel because she had been displaced 
from her finca due to the conflict with the FARC, 
implied that hasty construction by residents of 
the area and the landslide were directly linked: 
‘Around the time of the landslide, people were 
building a lot; the neighbourhood was populated 
in a year. Those three neighbourhoods that are 
in the upper part used to be really populated. 
People build and build and build’.
While the local government and residents 
not affected by the landslide did not explicitly 
say that it was directly the fault of affected 
citizens for living in the path of a landslide, in 
public discourse it often appeared that people 
with little other choice than to live where they 
could find cheap accommodation, and who had 
received planning permission to build, were 
being blamed for high levels of exposure. Every 
resident we interviewed had received a licence to 
build their house from the Planeación (planning 
department), and this was confirmed by the 
mayor of Mocoa. The government had been 
unable to deal with soaring housing demand 
from high rates of in-migration due to the 
protracted conflict in the Bajo Putumayo region, 
which pushed residents to move to Mocoa. 
This resulted in hasty and risky construction, 
responsible in large part for the level of 
devastation caused by the landslide in 2017. 
San Miguel, a neighbourhood entirely destroyed 
by the landslide, had been constructed over 
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the last 10 years, and its residents were almost 
exclusively people displaced by conflict.
The mayor also referred to ‘climate change’ 
as an important cause of the landslide. He spoke 
of how environmental changes are resulting in 
unexpected outcomes: ‘This region has 4,500ml 
of rainfall every year … And it’s the place where 
the most “hydric charges” exist. I think that 
this sector is being affected by climate change. 
While in coastal regions, the melting of ice brings 
floods, here, climate change changes the mossy 
“mattresses” that contain water [resulting in 
less absorption of water]’. Likewise, an SNGRD 
official interviewed for this study said that the 
landslide was unprecedented and a consequence of 
climate change: ‘Here it has rained for a full day 
in the past and nothing like this has happened. 
Then this time it rained three hours and look what 
happened. Of course, it’s climate change’. For its 
part, the media were far less convinced. According 
to El Tiempo: ‘It is not fair to blame climate 
change and “the fury of nature” on what in 
reality is the lack of our own urban planning and 
lack of institutional capacity … The government 
uses climate change as an excuse to avoid its 
responsibility to its citizens’ (Behrentz, 2017). 
In the public spaces where politics is 
performed and enacted, there was more emphasis 
on placing responsibility for the disaster on 
climate change. Concurrently, there was also a 
consistent narrative around affected populations 
being unaware of danger and putting themselves 
in ‘risky’ locations that would inevitably be 
affected by hazard-related disasters, despite little 
municipal government action on ex-ante DRR in 
‘obviously’ high-risk zones. 
In the imagination of people living in areas 
adjacent to the landslide, the neighbourhood of 
San Miguel was often referred to as a dangerous 
area with significant ‘social problems’ brought 
in by the desplazados. Maris, who lived in the 
neighbourhood of Obrero, adjacent to San 
Miguel, said: ‘It was a popular neighbourhood 
with victims of armed conflict. There were many 
7 We asked Sofia, a displaced widow from San Miguel resettled in the new neighbourhood of Villa Aurora, whether she 
had noticed any ‘social problems’ in her old neighbourhood. She replied that ‘I never heard anything like that. Where I 
lived was very healthy and nice. I never heard anything about any of the neighbourhoods around there. They were safe’. 
While we were not able to interview a large number of residents directly from San Miguel, the two we did speak to did not 
particularly ascribe to this narrative.
problems. They were selling alcohol beginning in 
the early morning, there was even prostitution’. 
This was not an uncommon view among 
interviewees from Mocoa, most of whom did 
not live in San Miguel but in surrounding areas.7 
Andreas contexualised this by explaining that: 
I think there are many fake stories 
about that. This is a Catholic topic, 
where people think of the landslide 
as a divine punishment. I think it is a 
cruel version of the story because no 
one, it does not matter what him or 
her did, deserves that something like 
that happens to them. But I think that 
behind the stories is that people say 
that the tragedy happened where bad 
people lived, and it is simply not true.
As this summary shows, the factors thought to be 
behind the disaster varied depending on who was 
being asked, from climate change and unusually 
heavy rainfall to residents being careless and hasty 
with construction to ‘immoral people’ leading 
‘debauched’ lives. Reference to the significant 
numbers of displaced people moving to Mocoa 
and the pressures this was putting on the city’s 
crumbling infrastructure was not a common theme 
in interviews with policy-makers, though the 
former head of the UARIV in Putumayo, who was 
perhaps in a position to have a more frank and 
open discussion, spoke of corruption within the 
mayor’s office allowing land in hazardous areas 
to be sold to vulnerable and desperate people to 
make ‘quick cash’. From interviews for this study, 
it was clear that the municipal authorities were not 
equipped to deal with the mushrooming population 
living in these hazard-prone areas, despite selling 
them land titles allowing them to live there. 
There also seemed to be some confusion 
around early warning systems (EWS). According 
to the mayor, in an effort to abide by Law 1523, 
the authorities had just started working on EWS 
when the landslide hit:
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And in these zones that are high risk, 
they have installed an early warning 
system, which is very complicated, 
which includes machines but also 
community plans to call out to the 
communities to evacuate … The early 
warning system was made by a firm 
with lots of professionals. They have 
meteorological stations and they 
monitor the river levels.
The mayor did, however, admit that, while they 
were not prepared in 2017 for the scale of the 
disaster caused by the landslide, the authorities 
had since taken steps to implement systems to 
support communities to cope better with extreme 
weather events. The SNGRD official agreed: ‘We 
have been working with these early warning 
systems for three years and the most modern 
one is in Mocoa, because of what happened’. 
This confidence in new ‘technological’ and 
‘modern’ EWS was not, however, echoed on the 
ground among communities. Maris, who had 
been campaigning for better risk reduction and 
mitigation, said she did not see the point of EWS 
as it did not make her feel safe:
Now they do drills to evacuate, but 
there are no shelters. I am not going out 
on the street with my kids in the middle 
of the rain. If I wake up my little boy, 
who is warm, and I take him out in the 
rain he gets sick. Near my house, the 
street looks like a river … we have no 
escape routes or safe rendezvous points.
Interviewees either said they were not familiar 
with drills and other aspects of EWS, or that they 
had heard about them but did not participate in 
them because of the way they were being run. 
Drills were often scheduled for late at night, and 
evacuation routes did not seem sensible to people 
who had lived in the area for years. There remains 
a need to more effectively understand and respond 
to local perceptions of risk and design appropriate 
risk reduction measures with accompanying risk 
communications, tailored to local needs. Such 
initiatives need to be cognisant of the lack of trust 
in the state, which makes the implementation and 
uptake of EWS additionally complicated.
3.2.1 Competing visions of DRR in Mocoa 
Discussions with government officials and 
those at the helm of policy-making regularly 
referred to the political shift in thinking in 
Colombia since Law 1523, from response to 
risk reduction, and the positive impact this has 
had. One official with the SNGRD in Putumayo, 
for example, spoke of the substantial support 
municipal and local offices had begun to receive 
to deliver DRR: ‘We also give technical assistance 
in normal situations, like “knowledge” for 
reduction and action … We give training and 
technical assistance and we have resources and 
machinery when it is needed … We have invested 
a lot in risk reduction’. Other officials reported 
substantial increases in technical capacity 
(including through the use of consultants) ‘with 
the capacity to manage everything that can 
happen’, including ‘geologists, geographers, 
environmental engineers and architects’. There 
seems to be a determination to move forward 
with technical planning and implementation 
of official risk reduction. On the ground, this 
agenda is being pushed forward even when it 
causes significant problems for residents living in 
affected neighbourhoods. Indeed, as the Mocoa 
case indicates, there may be an official view that 
it is people who are the ‘problem’: the SNGRD 
official quoted above regarding developments in 
Putumayo also bemoaned the fact that ‘every day, 
more people locate themselves in zones of risk 
… if the community doesn’t take a role in risk 
management, the risks will continue. It is hard to 
kick people out of the high-risk zones. People can 
be dangerous as well’. 
Three hundred households affected by the 
landslide in Mocoa have been relocated to 
resettlement land, now called Ville Aurora. When 
asked how the land had been acquired, it was 
evident that this had been a tense process:
The UNGRD bought it. The 
municipality is autonomous in saying 
where, people need UNGRD, as it 
has the resources to buy it. There are 
various mechanisms. 1) You sell it to 
me. 2) If you don’t want to sell it, I’ll 
expropriate it under a judicial sentence. 
When it is of public interest and if you 
don’t want to sell it, I’ll expropriate it. 
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A hard engineering-driven DRR paradigm 
that over-emphasises relocation and resettlement 
was often the clearest message coming from state 
authorities, partly as a result of high-modernist 
state policies ‘best conceived as a strong, one 
might even say muscle-bound, version of the 
beliefs in scientific and technical progress’ (Scott, 
1998), and partly a legacy of decades of conflict 
and large-scale displacement and resettlement 
(Fraser, 2017). 
Residents affected by the Mocoa disaster and 
who still continued to live in exposed and ‘risky’ 
areas often presented an alternative vision of DRR 
that spoke to a different way of understanding 
and living with risk. Interviewees often indicated 
that large-scale technical interventions based 
on ‘science’ seemed to miss the point, with the 
state often putting them at greater risk through 
haphazard and irresponsible resettlement (Fraser, 
2017). Laura, whose land on the outskirts of 
Mocoa had been expropriated by the municipal 
government to resettle neighbourhoods affected 
by the landslide, was visibly upset by the decision. 
Beyond her financial loss, she saw a disregard for 
natural systems and ecosystems in the government’s 
placement of the resettlement scheme:
the land used to be agrarian. We have 
been living forever by producing milk 
… My dad is an environment lover; he 
would give his own life for it. The lands 
have their own water streams, their 
wetlands and the lands have a forest 
reserve of more than seven hectares. And 
the government in their haste didn’t take 
this into account. Now I think: how is 
it possible for the government to come 
here to destroy that many trees, flora, 
and fauna for a political whim? They 
just took into account what the IGAC 
[Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi 
(Colombia’s national Geographic 
Institute)] says. IGAC is the entity that 
makes the geographic study. But they are 
violating everything. According to their 
maps, there are no water streams, there 
are no wetlands and there is not a forest. 
8 Plan de Orderamiento Territorial. 
My dad used to have a nature reserve 
but he did not legalise it. But there it is.
According to this interviewee, a technocratic 
government could not have the same depth of 
knowledge around managing community risk as 
people familiar with the local context. For Laura, 
her father’s understanding of the intricacies of the 
local ecosystem was simply not comparable to 
the scientific knowledge produced by the IGAC. 
For Laura, all agencies such as the IGAC can 
do is make maps that support the government’s 
vision of risk reduction through resettlement. 
Maris, whose house in Mocoa was very close 
to the landslide, told us that resettlement schemes 
are driven by political agendas, not by what 
affected people want:
The government has made housing 
projects, but the municipal 
administration has always said that 
it does not have the room to build. 
However, the buildings that the 
government makes are not very good. 
Corruption is very strong, there are 
people who have received housing, 
but they are made with low-quality 
standards … I have studied the POT8 
[municipal plan] and it says that one 
should not change his or her way 
of life. Here, most of the people are 
displaced from the countryside, or we 
are indigenous and we are accustomed 
to meet as a family. My daughters come 
with their husbands and we meet to eat. 
In these new houses, we will have to 
change our Amazonian culture, peasant 
and ancestral.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Jose, the 
leader of an indigenous civil society movement. 
He too was concerned that they were not 
included in formal consultations:
We are lobbying the government 
to make dignified housing, with a 
differential approach, that is in keeping 
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with our cosmovision [worldview] and 
culture. We don’t just have houses, we 
have ceremonial spaces, we have spaces 
for our plants … So, these spaces that 
we need to promote our culture, so that 
our kids don’t lose their culture, this 
is what we’re asking for. But they just 
want to hand us over a house that is 
designed by them. ‘Go up there.’
There seem to be conflicting visions of DRR 
between the state and affected citizens in 
Colombia (Fraser, 2017). In a country with 
a history of state violence against its citizens, 
this ideational conflict evidently puts the state–
citizen relationship under further stress. In fact, 
these incompatible visions of DRR were often 
experienced by people in the form of an ‘uncaring’, 
even a ‘brutal’, state, whose policies result in 
dispossession or displacement. In both Mocoa 
and Northern Antioquia, there was a prevalent 
narrative around a state that is not concerned 
for the well-being (through locally relevant risk 
reduction) of desplazados or campesinos. In a 
context where insurgencies against the state have 
been the norm rather than the exception, the 
importance of engaging in a more meaningful and 
genuinely bottom-up dialogue on DRR becomes 
ever more critical. The culture of ‘expert-led’ 
planning in Colombia, perhaps because of the need 
to insulate certain policy areas from the politics 
of conflict, is as prevalent and disempowering 
as it was during the height of the insurgency 
(Berney, 2010: 544). And yet alternatives are 
available. Prioritising investment in building local 
knowledge and capacity could increase the ability 
of individuals to understand and act on disaster 
risk – skills which could be transferred to new sites 
should individuals move to other high-risk areas 
over the course of their lifetime.
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4 Navigating competing 
visions for reducing 
disaster risk in conflict 
contexts: policy 
recommendations
This paper has examined Colombia’s experience 
with disasters in areas directly and indirectly 
affected by armed conflict and insurgency. 
Disasters and conflict interact and intersect 
in people’s everyday lives, but the legal and 
institutional frameworks for dealing with 
them are compartmentalised, with insufficient 
consideration of how linked vulnerabilities 
manifest. This contrasts with narratives from 
operational agencies on the complexity of the 
context, and the need to consider risks and threats 
holistically, reflecting the lived experiences of 
people affected by both conflict and disaster. The 
compartmentalisation of the UARIV and UNGRD 
institutional regimes plays out in unhelpful, even 
problematic, ways on the ground. Interviewees in 
Mocoa affected by disasters and conflict were not 
always sure why their neighbour received a pay-
out from one agency while they did not. 
What can be learnt from Colombia’s 
experience with disasters and conflict, and what 
are some possible areas where institutional 
regimes dealing with a large population of 
‘doubly affected’ citizens can be strengthened?
Moving away from an over-reliance on 
technocratic expert-led DRR towards a more 
community-based vision which allows for lived 
experiences of conflict, both past and present, 
to be intrinsically considered. There seemed to 
be agreement among interviewees in Mocoa and 
Northern Antioquia on the lack of engagement 
they had had in consultation processes before 
the disaster – hazard mapping, etc. – and in the 
aftermath, when rehabilitation plans were being 
drawn up. Jose, the indigenous leader from 
Mocoa, was emphatic that local people had not 
been included in any consultations. 
Priority 2 of the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction clearly states that, 
when DRR laws are being drafted at the 
national and local levels, it is essential to 
‘undertake comprehensive public and community 
consultations during the development of 
such laws and regulations to support their 
implementation’. While Colombia has signed on 
to this framework for inclusive and progressive 
DRR, an institutional approach that is 
technocratic and focused on a hard engineering-
driven disaster policy regime seems to dominate 
(Fraser, 2016). ‘Solutions’ to risk reduction 
seem to be focused on expert-led disaster 
risk planning, including high-cost hardware 
and infrastructural responses. According to 
some political analysis, DRR interventions are 
clearly tangible and visible, helping to appease 
supporters and ‘buy’ political support. Several 
interviewees suggested that the belief in top-
down interventions is partly a consequence 
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of Colombia’s troubled political history, with 
bureaucrats wary of bringing people’s voices into 
policy planning debates for fear of this space 
being taken over or captured by the conflict, and 
the partisanship associated with it.
Affected people interviewed for this research 
did not see these expert-led infrastructural 
interventions as the only way forward, and 
were deeply critical of the government’s 
preference for such measures. For interviewees, 
there was a strong sense that their worldview, 
culture and way of life had to be reflected 
and respected in DRR interventions. A 
legally mandated and robust system for local 
consultations – representative of indigenous 
people’s organisations, women and youth 
groups and a diverse array of social and 
political groups – in the development of DRR 
policies and projects in Colombia would go 
some way towards addressing this. It would 
enable a more integrated DRR approach that 
addresses people’s demands for social justice 
and helps repair state–society relations. Several 
interviewees indicated that, while a legal 
framework for local consultation exists, for 
instance in the POT, consultations rarely actually 
take place. To guarantee an early and diverse 
consultation process, municipalities need to be 
better resourced, with staff who deal specifically 
with public-facing consultation processes, along 
with stronger punitive measures in the event 
consultation at municipal level is ignored. Such 
measures could even help lay the foundations for 
establishing or rebuilding the social contract and 
state–society relations. 
Institutional capacities and disconnects – 
between centre and local, and across agencies 
of the state: who enacts DRR, formally or 
informally, in regions with legacies of violence 
and armed conflict? It was evident throughout 
the research that there was significant disparity 
between the competence and functioning of 
national-level bureaucrats and institutions – 
those drafting the plans – and their translation 
into local-level plans and implementation, which 
routinely lack finances to deliver the ambitions 
articulated in those plans. This creates obvious 
barriers to delivering national DRR plans at 
the local level. This problem is compounded 
by the fact that, in smaller towns and villages, 
Colombians tend to regard the state in Bogotá 
with considerable suspicion and mistrust. 
The case of the disaster in Mocoa was 
somewhat unusual in that the recognition 
that many landslide victims were also conflict-
displaced prompted informal action to encourage 
coordination between the UNGRD and UARIV. 
The suggestion that the government may have 
accelerated reparations from the UARIV for these 
‘doubly affected’ people is one example of the 
potential for linked actions. There is anecdotal 
evidence that this has created some tensions 
within communities where people who have 
waited years for reparations are yet to receive 
them, whereas people affected by the landslide 
received assistance. This makes Mocoa an 
unusual and interesting moment in post-disaster 
politics in Colombia. As one OCHA interviewee 
put it: ‘this is what we want to promote: not the 
disaster management unit being involved in the 
conflict situation, but to be aware where there is 
a conflict situation and to recognise that’. There 
is therefore an urgent need to better understand 
the ways in which informal coordination 
between these two agencies has improved or 
could improve responses for populations ‘doubly 
affected’, the challenges or limitations to future 
coordination and the ways in which this can – 
formally or informally – be overcome. 
Political classification and the politics of 
access to different types of support require a 
shift away from repeatedly needing to prove 
either deservedness or danger. Scholars point out 
that ‘citizenship and the benefits it confers are 
mediated by and predicated on a governmental 
rationality that classifies subjects and manages 
populations according to the degree to which 
their lives are in danger’ (Zeiderman, 2013). 
Those people considered to be living under 
most risk can make claims on the state, for 
resettlement, reparation and so forth. There is a 
very clear and evident politics of access managed 
and governed through the politics of classification 
by the state. The case of the floods in Bajo Cauca 
and Northern Antioquia demonstrates how these 
classifications were effectively used to refuse 
payments to people registered as desplazados as 
opposed to damnificados. 
In the context of disasters, particularly in 
countries where the state–society relationship is 
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marked by conflict or mistrust, as in Colombia, 
universal interventions that address all affected 
citizens can be effective in restoring faith in 
the state (Siddiqi, 2013; 2018). The state in 
Colombia needs to examine ways to reach 
out to all citizens affected by disasters and 
conflict – for instance by exploring the viability 
of distributions through social transfers – rather 
than repeatedly asking them to prove either 
deservedness or danger. 
Establishing a clear and enforced legal 
responsibility for DRR of anthropogenic 
disasters, especially when disaster risks are 
created by private actors. The Bajo Cauca 
floods demonstrate clearly that ‘privatising’ 
responsibility for disaster response and risk 
reduction does not work. Considering the scale 
of the challenges it is creating for people in 
these historically marginalised communities, 
and the ways in which it is driving a deeper 
wedge between communities and the state, 
this is a potentially explosive situation for the 
government, made worse by the fact that there 
does not seem to be an adequate institutional 
framework to deal with it.
In field research in Mocoa, while it was evident 
that there were gaps and shortcomings in the 
institutional response, there was a municipal, 
state-led response that was escalated all the way 
to the national level when the need arose. In 
the case of the floods in Northern Antioquia, 
however, it seemed equally evident that whether 
the UNGRD was to be involved, and the extent 
to which it was responsible for post-disaster 
response, and where this became the duty of 
EPM remained unclear. This was not just unclear 
to residents affected by the disaster, but equally 
it seems to those making policy and giving public 
statements in the press. Given the frequency and 
scale of such disasters (the Brumadinho dam in 
Brazil collapsed less than a year after the Mocoa 
floods, killing more than 171 people), Colombia 
needs robust preventive and punitive laws to 
safeguard its citizens.
Strengthening the underlying social contract 
– rights, duties and responsibilities, underpinned 
by considerations of voice, empowerment and 
9 www.futurity.org/colombia-farc-deforestation-1930522-2/.
accountability. Strengthening the rights and 
entitlements of citizens through protection 
mandated by law is a critical step in addressing 
disasters in areas affected by armed conflict and 
insecurity. In engaging with a DRR process that 
is more consultative, transparent and equal; that 
addresses people’s basic human security versus 
just addressing one form of insecurity while 
leaving them vulnerable to another; that sees 
all affected people as citizens without asking 
them to prove deservedness; that legally protects 
people from disasters created by profit-making 
enterprises, Colombia will see improvements in 
the wider state–citizen relationship, and in the 
lived experience of people affected by disasters 
and insecurity.
This research shows how the specific 
relationship between disasters, patterns of 
vulnerability and the experience and dynamics 
of conflict in different locales across Colombia 
varies considerably. The drivers of the disaster 
in Northern Antioquia were not the same as 
the drivers or the response in Mocoa. Likewise, 
disasters and conflict differentially affect citizens’ 
experiences and perceptions of the government, 
and thus require nuanced and thorough 
consideration of conflict dynamics in the design 
and delivery of DRR. Urgent action is required 
to deepen our collective knowledge and 
understanding of the disaster–conflict interface 
in Colombia. 
New manifestations of the disaster–conflict 
interface continue to emerge, from within and 
beyond Colombia’s borders. For example, there 
is evidence to suggest that post-Accord Colombia 
is more vulnerable to landslides and floods due to 
deforestation. The demobilisation of FARC has 
resulted in previously guerrilla-controlled forests 
now becoming accessible to illegal loggers. 
Where the FARC were known to have their 
own forest conservation policies, the year after 
demobilisation saw a spike of 600% in forest 
clearing fires.9 The Venezuelan crisis is creating 
a further layer of complexity. Many interviewees 
felt that the crisis is overwhelming institutions, 
detracting from progress on the Peace Accord, 
DRR and development more broadly. 
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The case of Northern Antioquia and Mocoa 
provides insights into the complexity of the 
challenges involved in identifying and pursuing 
DRR ambitions in dynamic conflict contexts, and 
reveals the limitations of a technocratic approach 
to DRR – including how ill-informed approaches 
can further damage state–society relations. New 
challenges from the demobilisation of the FARC 
and the Venezuelan crisis signal that complex, 
competing and dynamic conditions of violence 
and conflict are part of the fabric of society in 
which disaster risks manifest, and will be for 
some years to come. Finding viable solutions will 
require the DRR community to accelerate pursuit 
of knowledge about DRR in contexts affected 
by violence and conflict and, as part of that, to 
better understand how to support communities, 
agencies and governments to navigate the reality 
that there are competing visions for reducing 
disaster risk in conflict contexts.
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